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Non{technical summary
The recent release of the New Basel Capital Accord on capital adequacy for bank credit
assets proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has caused the
lending policy of European private banks to come under severe reform pressure.
The New Basel Capital Accord will be implemented in member jurisdiction in 2004. It con-
tains far{reaching suggestions to reorganize the equity capitalization of private banks with
respect to their lending business. Corporate lending currently requires a blanket coverage
of eight percent of the banks' equity, regardless of the riskiness of the credit portfolio. An
important new feature of the New Basel Capital Accord in this context is that private banks
are allowed to use their own rating systems in order to determine their risk{adequate equity
deposit (Internal Ratings{Based Approach). A study of the rating approaches of 30 private
banks analyzed by the BCBS in the G{10 member states has, however, revealed that the
credit rating approaches of private banks dier markedly from one another, ranging from
pure expert systems to systems that rely entirely on statistical methods. Even more impor-
tantly, most private banks suer from a severe lack of credit risk data.
A common solution to the data dilemma is the use of credit rating agency information such
as those oered by Germany's largest credit rating agency Creditreform or by the worldwide
leading data provider Dun & Bradstreet. This paper analyzes the determinants of nancial
distress using a large sample drawn from the Creditreform data base. Since credit rating
agency data make it possible to track rms for several years, a dynamic approach to inves-
tigating transitions between dierent states of nancial distress is used in this paper.
The main results of the econometric analysis can be summarized as follows: both rm age
and rm size signicantly aect transition probability. The direction of this eect depends,
however, upon the departure state so that no general conclusions can be drawn on this count.
Financially non{distressed limited liability rms tend to switch to less desirable nancial
states more often than unlimited liability entities. Interestingly, given that a rm is already
in `medium' distress, the probability of moving to the no{distress state is signicantly larger
for limited liability rms than for unlimited liability entities. The existence of corporate
shareholders increases the probablity of transition to more favorable nancial statuses while
just the reverse is true for relationships with multiple creditors. Firm diversication has
a signicant eect only on the transitions starting from the `no nancial distress' state.
The estimation results indicate that diversication increases the likelihood of movements to
worse nancial states. Finally, a positive macroeconomic development increases the likeli-
hood of transition to better nancial situations.
1 Introduction
The lending policy of European private banks has recently come under reform pressure. As
a consequence of an increased number of business failures and the associated writing{o of
credits in recent years (Creditreform 2000; Dun & Bradstreet 1998; Wui and Hunt 1993),
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
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released the New Basel Capital
Accord in January 2001 on capital adequacy for bank credit assets. The Accord contains
detailed suggestions for reorganizing the equity capitalization of private banks with respect
to their lending business. These suggestions mainly concern corporate lending and will
become eective in 2004 when they become, probably with amendments, member jurisdic-
tion and replace the 1988 Basel accord.
2
Corporate lending currently requires a blanket
coverage of eight percent of the banks' equity, independent of the riskiness of the banks'
credit portfolio. An important novelty of the New Basel Capital Accord in this context is
that private banks are allowed to use their own rating systems in order to determine their
risk{adequate equity deposit (Internal Ratings{Based Approach). In a study of 30 private
banks in G{10 member states, the BCBS has found that the credit rating approaches of the
analyzed private banks markedly dier from one another, ranging from pure expert systems
to systems that rely completely on statistical methods.
3
Although it of course is not quite
clear whether statistical methods actually perform better than expert systems, as they did
not at leat 30 years ago (Wu 1969); the BCBS nds it desirable that banks' rating systems
are based on comparable standards.
4
Even more important, the BCBS has discovered that
there is a severe lack of credit le data, which is the main ingredient of any credit rating
system.
But how should private banks construct a rating system without having credit data at hand
and without knowing a debtor's credit history? One solution often used by banks | which
is also explicitly allowed in the New Basel Capital Accord
5
| is the use of credit rating
agency data such as those of the worldwide operating agency Dun & Bradstreet and Ger-
many's largest rm information provider Creditreform.
6
This paper follows the investigates
rms' nancial situation by analyzing credit rating agency data. A major advantage of such
data is that individual rms can be tracked for several years so that movements in and out
of nancial distress can be studied. A further advantage of credit rating agency data is that
rm information is available on almost every rm. Approaches that rely on balance sheet
data can, by denition, only be applied if balance sheet data exists at all. Commercial law,
1
The BCBS was founded in 1974 by the G{10 memberstates as an international forum for the coordination
of banking supervision.
2
See the BCBS's website at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm for more details. The special issue
of the Journal of Banking & Finance on `Credit Ratings and the Proposed New BIS Guidelines on Capital
Adequacy for Bank Credit Assets' (2001) deals with the New Basel Capital Accord in great detail. Topics
include general comments on the Accord, its eects on portfolio management and its impact on the rating
industry.
3
Treacy and Carey (2000) compare rating systems of the 50 largest U.S. banking organizations and
also show that practices dier markedly across the investigated units. Cantor and Packer (1997) refer to
dierences in rating opinions across rating rms.
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For example, Somerville and Taer (1995) compare formal and expert risk country assessments and
conclude that experts tend to be overly pessimistic.
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See paragraph 44 of the BCBS document \The Internal Ratings Based Approach" for more details
(http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf).
6
Internet information on Dun & Bradstreet: http://www.dnb.com/, on Creditreform:
http://www.creditreform.de/.
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however, usually requires only large rms to publish their balances.
7
In contrast to many older studies of rms' credit risk which simply investigated the determi-
nants of default,
8
this paper takes a rms' entire nancial distress history into account. For
example, it investigates the probability that a rm runs from a (somehow dened) medium
distress nancial distress situation to a `no nancial problem' or a `severe nancial problem'
state.
The appropriate econometric tools to analyze movements between dierent states of nan-
cial distress are Markov chains. Markov chains have been widely applied in studies of default
risk (Altman and Kao 1992; Bennett 1984; del Angel et al. 1998; Lawrence et al. 1992;
Smith and Lawrence 1995; Nickell et al. 2000) and are the basic ingredient of J.P. Morgan's
(1997) CreditMetrics approach.
9
Following Ngyuen van et al. (2000), the Markov{chain
model applied in this paper extends the standard approaches in that it introduces unob-
served rm heterogeneity, i.e. it is controlled for rm{specic factors which are not observed
by the analyst.
One of the fastest growing sectors of any developed economy is the service sector. Among
services, business{related services usually exhibit the highest growth rates (Eurostat 2000).
Due to a lack of appropriate data and despite its growing importance, the service sector
still is well underresearched both in the credit risk and in the business failure literature.
This appears to be a severe shortcoming since rm default and credit default is especially
widespread among service sector rms (Creditreform 2000, Phillips and Kirchho 1989,
May{Strobl and Paulini 1996). This paper therefore adds to the existing literature by its
orientation towards the business{related services sector. The focusing on the business{
related services has the further advantage that sector{specic factors such as business{cycle
eects can be properly taken into account by using information from a business survey in
the business{related services sector.
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A last novel aspect of this paper is that it aims at combining the existing literature on
credit risk measurement with that of industrial organization. In their comprehensive survey
of credit risk measurement, Altman and Saunders (1998, p. 1724) write that \credit{scoring
bankruptcy prediction models are only tenuously linked to an underlying theoretical model".
By motivating the factors that drive rms in and out of nancial distress by reviewing rel-
evant existing theoretical studies in industrial economics, I try to merge the burgeoning
industrial economics literature on rm performance with the literature on nancial distress
measurement.
This paper denes nancial distress in terms of rms' credit repayment mode. Three cat-
egories of repayment are considered: (i) a `no problem' state, where rms receive cash
discounts and pay their outstanding debts within agreed limits; (ii) a `medium problem'
7
For example, German commercial law makes the publication of balances compulsory for rms with: (i)
a balance sheet total of more than DM 125 Mio. p.a., (ii) total sales of DM 250 Mio. p.a. and (iii) more
than 5,000 employees. Two out of the three criteria have to be fullled to make the publication of a balance
sheet compulsory, so that only a minor fraction of German rms actually publishes such data.
8
See the surveys by Altman (1984) Altman and Saunders (1998), Altman and Narayan (1997) and the
special issues of the Journal of Banking & Finance on `Company and Country Risk Models' (1984), on
`International Business Failure Prediction Models' (1988) and on `Credit Risk Assessment and Relationship
Lending' (1999) and the references cited therein.
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Also see Gordy (2000), who shows that CreditMetrics and Credit Suisse Financial Product's CreditRisk
+
have similar mathematical structures.
10
Business{related services are dened by the following sectors (Miles 1993): Computers and related
activities, Accounting and book{keeping, tax consultancy, Management Consultancy, Architectural activi-
ties, Engineering activities, Advertising, Renting of automobiles and transport equipment, Renting of other
machinery and equipment, Cargo handling and storage and Sewage and refuse disposal.
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state, where rms do not meet their obligations within the agreed time schedule and (iii)
a `severe problem' state, where debt{collection agencies are authorized to collect the out-
standing debt or court procedures are started.
11
The panel data set used in this study consists of 15,538 rms biennially observed from
fall 1994 until fall 1999 leading to a total of 90,302 observations. The main results of the
econometric analysis are that both rm age and rm size signicantly aect the transition
probability. The direction of this eect, however, depends upon the starting state so that no
general conclusions can be drawn on this count. Financially non{distressed limited liability
rms tend to switch to less desirable nancial states more often than unlimited liability
entities. Given that a rm already is in `medium' distress, the probability of moving to the
no{distress state is signicantly larger for limited liability than for unlimited liability rms.
The existence of corporate shareholders increases the probablity of transition to more favor-
able nancial statuses while just the reverse is true for relationships with multiple creditors.
Firm diversication has a signicant eect on the transitions starting from the `no nancial
distress' state only. The estimation results indicate that diversication increases the likeli-
hood of movements to worse nancial states. Finally, positive macroeconomic developments
increase the likelihood of transition to better nancial situations.
This paper starts with a review of the default risk literature and the rm survival literature
in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the data used in this paper. In Section 4, the economet-
ric approach to model transitions between dierent states of nancial distress is described.
Estimation results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous studies on rm performance
The literature on rms' credit risk and on rm survival could basically be labelled \literature
on the post{entry performance of rms". Both strands of the literature are concerned
with the way rms perform once they have entered the market. The literature on nancial
distress, however, is concerned with rm performance measured in terms of credit repayment
and credit riskiness, usually from a credit analysts' perspective, while the literature on rm
survival either takes the view of an economic policy maker or dispassionately describes the
forces which drive rms into problems. The explanatory variables included in the estimations
for the movements in and out of nancial distress are essentially based on models of industry
dynamics and explain the eect of rm size and rm age on rm turnover. Other variables
involved in the estimation capture rm{organizational aspects such as rms' legal status,
their degree of diversication and the presence of corporate shareholders as well as the
number of creditors. Finally, they include macroeconomic eects on rm performance.
In the rest of the paper I rst motivate the selection of variables included in the estimation by
deriving hypotheses from existing theoretical models on rm performance and rm survival.
My own empirical results are discussed afterwards in light of these hypotheses and on the
background of earlier empirical studies.
Firm age
In an important contribution to the literature on the evolution of industries, Jovanovic
(1982) introduced a market model with noisy selection of entrants. Firms are assumed not
to know their own productivity when they enter the market. They observe the productivity
of competitors and learn about their own relative productivity in relation to the competitors'
11
Note that this denition compares well to the one given in the New Basel Capital Accord (see
paragraph 146 of the BCBS document \The Internal Ratings Based Approach" for more details;
(http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf).
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productivity as they continue to stay in the market. Pakes (1998) has shown that many
functional specications of Jovanovics' model imply that it takes time for entrant rms to
acquire suÆcient information about their productivity parameters before they are able to
decide whether to exit or to stay in the market. The instantaneous risk of liquidation thus
rst increases and then decreases as the entrant rm's beliefs in its own productivity is
updated and improved in precision.
12
This takes us to
Hypothesis 1: Eect of rm age. Firm age has an inverse U{shaped (a U{shaped)
eect on the probability of moving into (out of) nancial distress.
Firm size
In the models by Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) as well as Klepper (1996), innovation is
the driving force behind the mobility of rms. Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) show that
major process innovations are challenging to adopt for small rms and hence might force
them to exit. Their model is tested using data from the U.S. tire industry and appears to
t reality well. The approach by Klepper (1996) is basically in the same line as that of
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) and also stresses the superior ability of larger and older
rms to adjust to drastic innovations.
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Closely related to the ability to adapt to drastic innovations is rms' access to the credit
market. Large rms may nd it easier to receive external nance since they might be able
to pledge more collateral, which implies that rms' size should have a negative eect on
the probabilty of moving into nancial distress. Organizational geriatics, however, may also
evolve from the inexible organziation of large rms. The larger rms are, the more diÆcult
it is to monitor managers and employees. Intra{rm communication is also more diÆcult
than in small entities. It thus seems plausible that an optimal rm size exists which accounts
for the trade{o between organization exibility and input as well as output market power
so Hypothesis 2 states
Hypothesis 2: Eect of rms size. Firm size has an inverse U{shaped (a U{
shaped) eect on the probability of moving into (out of) nancial distress.
Limited liability
One of the earliest studies on the eect of limited liability on rm default is Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981).
14
They show that under limited liability, entrepreneurs choose projects char-
acterized by relatively high expected return and a relatively high risk of failure.
Much of the newer literature on the theory of an entrepreneur's choice of legal form is based
on transaction cost theory (Gilson 1991; Grundfest 1992; Harho et al. 1998; Horvath and
Woywode 1997). A limitation of rms' liability entails substantially higher legal fees and
taxes compared to the legal form of sole proprietorship. Limited liability rms may also face
12
A model closely related to Jovanovic's (1982) approach is Frank (1988). An extension of the Jovanovic
model is presented by Ericsson and Pakes (1995), who introduce active learning.
13
Additional empirical evidence, again for the U.S. tire industry, is provided in Klepper and Simons
(2000).
14
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explain equilibrium credit rationing which has been extensively studied empir-
ically in recent years. Credit restriction in an investment context is reviewed by Hubbard (1999). German
evidence on this issue is provided by Elston (1996), Harho (1998, for R&D investment), Plotscher and
Rottmann (1998) and Winker (1999). Small and growing rms' access to credit markets is investigated in
Egeln et al. (1997, for Germany), Levensohn and Willard (2000), Westhead and Storey (1997), as well as in
the survey by Demiguc{Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) and in the special issue of Small Business Economics
(1996) on `Financial Structure and the Growing Small Firm'.
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higher cost of capital than unlimited liability rms. The main advantage of limited liability,
however, is that it allows entrepreneurs to restrict their personal risk up to the minimum
amount required for the foundation of limited liability rms. Hence, limited liability enables
entrepreneurs to reduce personal risk at comparatively higher cost imposed by taxation and
fees.
A drawback of my study and also of earlier empirical analyses on the eects of limited liabil-
ity on rm performance is that collaterization is usually not observed in the data.
15
Harho
et al. (1998), however, were able to get access to insolvency records of the registration court
of a medium{sized German town and conclude (p. 457) \that in Germany banks appear to
be particularly successful in attaining full collaterization (...)". Even though full collater-
ization may be often feasible, from an entrepreneurs' perspective limited liability still is a
device to reduce personal risk. Hence, the hypothesis related to the eect of legal status on
default risk is:
Hypothesis 3: Eect of limited liability. Limited liability has a positive (nega-
tive) eect on the probability that rms move into (out of) nancial distress.
Corporate shareholders
Quite closely related to the discussion of collateralization and default risk is the role of
corporate shareholders in the history of rms' credit standings. The shareholding rm has
a virtual interest in its investment, hoping that it performs well and does not run into -
nancial distress. Access to external nance is likely to be easier for rms with corporate
shareholders than for rms without these investors. Thus, the hypothesis with respect to
the eect of corporate shareholders is:
Hypothesis 4: Eect of corporate shareholders.The existence of corporate share-
holders has a positive (negative) eect on the probability of moving out of (into)
nancial distress.
Number of creditors
Determining the optimal number of rm creditors has only been dealt with in recent years
in corporate nance literature. Theoretical contributions tackles this issue in an optimal
contracting framework (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein 1996). In these models, multiple credi-
tors discipline managers from strategic default, i.e. from diverting cash for themselves, since
debt renegotiation problems arise in the case of multiple creditors, which reduces mangers'
payo from strategic default. This implies that rms with multiple credit relationships are
less likely of moving into nancial distress than rms with single credit relationships, leading
to
Hypothesis 5: Eect of multiple creditors. Firms with multiple creditors are less
likely to run into nanical distress than rms with single creditors and vice versa.
Diversication
Jovanovic's (1993) model of product diversication choice captures four main reasons to
15
Much of the literature following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) focused on the role of collateral on rationing in
credit markets with imperfect information. See for example Boot and Thakor (1994), Besanko and Thakor
(1987), Bester (1985, 1987, 1994), Broll and Gilroy (1986), Chan and Kanatas (1985), Mattesini (1990),
Schmidt{Mohr (1997) and Wette (1983). Empirical studies on the relationship between default risk and
collaterization include Berger and Udell (1990), Boot et al. (1991) and, for Germany, Elsas and Krahnen
(1999) as well as Ewert et al. (2000).
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diversify: (i) gains in market power: rms with market power in two substitute product
elds may be more protable than two single product monopolies acting noncooperatively;
(ii) risk elimination: a diversied product portfolio makes a rm less vulnerable to eco-
nomic shocks; (iii) access to nancial resources: diversied rms may be able to obtain
more bargaining power in their banking relations than non{diversied rms; (iv) eÆciency
gains in production: diversied rms may be able to successfully use complementarities of
production factors such as the development of general{purpose technologies. This leads to
Hypothesis 6: Diversication Diversied rms are less (more) likely of moving
into (to leave) nancial distress than non{diversied rms.
Macroeconomic eects
That macroeconomic shocks are likely to have a signicant eect on rm performance is
obvious and does not require theoretical justication. In fact, many empirical studies have
found that macroeconomic eects aect rm survival. In this context, Andrade and Ka-
plan (1998) nd signicant eects of industry peformance on nancial distress. These are,
however, dominated by rm{specic factors. Using Belgian data, Sleuwaegen and Dehand-
schutter (1997) nd that domestic GDP growth has a signicantly negative eect on rm
exit. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) use U.S. credit rating data and present evidence for
signicant business cycle eects on rm survival. In a recent study for Japan, Honjo (2000)
observes a marked increase in the likelihood of rm exit after the Japanese economy faltered
in 1989/1990. In summary, business cycle eects inuence movements in and out of nancial
distress as follows:
Hypothesis 7: Eect of business cycles. A good (bad) overall industry perfor-
mance increase the likelihood of moving out of (into) nancial distress.
Excluded aspects
Clearly, a lot of variables often used in studies of default risk and rm survival have to be
left out here due to data constraints. For example, numerous authors have shown that the
human capital endowment of the entrepreneur is an important determinant for rm pefor-
mance. These studies include Audretsch and Vivarelli (1993), Bates (1990), Cressy (1995,
1999), Evans and Leighton (1989) Freeman et al. (1983), Hannan and Freeman (1989),
Lawrence et al. (1992), Li and Guisinger (1991) and Taylor (1999). German studies include
Bruderl et al. (1992), Hinz and Wilsdorf (1999, for eastern Germany) and Prantl (2000).
The data set used in this study, however, does not contain reliable information on personal
characteristics | just like any study relying on credit rating agency data.
Another crucial issue which has recently gained much attention during the discussion of
small business lending and the recent world{wide banking consolidation
16
is relationship
lending. Theoretical contributions on that count include Sharpe (1990) and Wilner (2000),
empirical evidence is provided by Berger and Udell (1995), D'Auria et al. (1999), Harho
and Korting (1998) as well as Petersen and Rajan (1994).
17
By and large, both the theoret-
ical and the empirical studies show that longstanding lending relationships help to improve
the nancial conditions of small businesses.
16
See for example Avery et al. (1999), Berger et al. (1998), DeYoung et al. (1999), Jayaratne and Wolken
(1999), Strahan and Weston (1996) and the special issues of the Journal of Banking & Finance on `The
Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry' (1999) and on `The Economics of Small Business Finance'
(1998).
17
Also see the special issue of the Journal of Banking & Finance on `Credit Risk Assessment and Rela-
tionship Lending' (1999).
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3 Data
The hypotheses listed in Section 2 are tested using data collected by Germany's leading
credit rating agency, Creditreform. The data set consists of 15,538 rms or 90,302 ob-
servations biennially observed between fall 1994 and fall 1999. Each rm entering the
Creditreform database is tracked until the entity is closed so that a balanced panel for each
rm is obtained. Firms that emerged from former German Democratic Republic entities,
which were privatized, reprivatized or partly privatized by the German privatization agency
`Treuhandanstalt' after German unication in 1990, are removed from the data set.
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Empirical analyses based on credit rating data have been subject to various sources of crit-
icisms. A large strand of the literature on rm survival applies data sets based on credit
rating agency data (for example Audretsch 1991, 1995; Audretsch and Mahmood 1995;
Evans 1987a, 1987b; Harho et al. 1998; Li and Guisinger 1991; Phillips and Kirchho
1989; Prantl 2000) and has been subject to criticism related to a potential bias of the data
sets (Audretsch 1995, Ch. 2.3). It has been argued that small rms are underrepresented in
credit rating agency data bases and that there might be a sample selection bias related to
legal form. Appendix A refers to such sample selection problems in greater detail by com-
paring the Creditreform data with information taken from oÆcial statistics and concludes
that the sample used in this paper is not likely to be aected by sample selection problems.
This is rather unsurprising since Creditrefom's core business is to provide up{to{data infor-
mation on the nancial situation of rms to its customers and also acts as a debt collecting
agency.
How does this paper dene `nancial distress'? The Creditreform database contains detailed
information on the mode of payment of the recorded rms. This information is much too
detailed to be analyzed in an econometric model so that it is condensed into three main
categories: (i) `no problem', where rms receive a cash discount and pay their outstanding
debts within agreements on targets; (ii) `medium problem', where rms do not meet their
obligations within the agreed time schedule and (iii) `severe problem', where debt collecting
agencies are authorized to collect the outstanding debt, the entrepreneur has to declare an
aÆrmation in lieu of an oath, or court composition proceedings or bankruptcy proceedings
are started. Table 1 displays observed transition rates between the three states of nancial
distress. The table shows that the `no problem' category is most densely populated; 80.5
percent of the rms start in this state. Morevover, only 3.5 of the rms starting with `no
problems' ever leave this state. More variation is present for the `medium problem' cate-
gory. 9.8 percent of the rms start in this state, of which 6.7 percent improve their nancial
condition. The nancial situation gets worse, however, for 9.8 percent of the rms. Least
variation is found in the `severe problem' category: 97.5 percent of the rms remain in this
state and if they switch at all, they switch to the `medium problem' category. Since there
are very few rms moving from `severe problem' to any other state both in absolute and
relative terms, the last row of the transition matrix is not considered hereafter.
The explanatory variables that are potentially able to explain movements in and out of
nancial distress as described in Section 2 are rm age and rm size and the variables for
limited liability, corporate stockholders, the existence of multiple credit relationships, rm
diversication and macroeconomic development are included in the Creditreform data set.
Firm size and rm age are both included as their natural logarithms and their squared
18
Written text information is available on almost every rm in the Creditreform data bases. A search
engine procedure using the word `Treuhandanstalt' or similar phrases was run to identify these rms.
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Table 1: Transition between the states of nancial distress
Ending state
`no `medium `severe
Starting state problem' problem' problem' Total
'no problem' # of obs. 70,256 1,714 762 72,732
share 96.6 2.4 1.1 80.5
'medium problem' # of obs. 591 7,372 865 8,828
share 6.7 83.5 9.8 9.8
'severe problem' # of obs. 21 198 8,523 8,742
share 0.2 2.3 97.5 9.7
Total # of obs. 70,868 9,284 10,150 90,302
share 78.5 10.3 11.2 100.0
term. The latter variables indicating corporate stockholder, multiple credit relationships
and diversication are represented by dummy variables in the econometric specication.
Information on macroeconomic uctuations is taken from another data source: the Service
Sector Business Survey (SSBS). The SSBS is a quarterly business survey which is collected
by the Centre for European Economic Research in cooperaton with Creditreform since the
second quarter of 1994. Details on this data set are presented in Kaiser et al. (2000). It
comprises roughly 1,000 rms across the ten sectors listed in Footnote 10 and are repeatedly
interviewed quarterly. It is a stratied random sample, stratied with respect to sectoral
aÆliation, rm size and aÆliation to western or eastern Germany. Questions asked in the
SSBS include the assessments of the respective rms' sales, price, demand, prot and em-
ployment development in the current quarter with respect to the previous quarter. Firms
give their assessment on a three point Likert scale.
In this paper, the indicator of macroeconomic uctuations is rms' assessment of sales
changes, since virtually any business survey asks for sales changes whereas few ask for
changes in rm prots (CIRET 1998). In order to aggregate rm{level information, bal-
ances i.e. the share of rms reporting increased sales minus the share of rms reporting
decreased sales, are calculated.
19
Since economic development markedly diers between
East German and West German rms as well as across sectors (Kaiser and Voss 2000),
these sales shares are individually calculated for each sector as well as for East Germany.
One period{lagged eects of business cycle changes on nancial performance is taken into
account by including rst lags of the sales changes instead of including only the contempo-
raneous variable.
Appendix B displays descriptive statistics for the variables included in the estimations.
4 A dynamic model of nancial distress
The transitions between the three dierent states of nancial distress are analyzed using
Markov chains. Markov chains are powerful instruments whenever an investigation calls
for a dynamic analysis of discrete phenomena. More specically, the dynamics of nancial
distress are analyzed by a multinomial logit model that is applied to panel data. The basic
idea is to estimate multinomial logit models for each of the three rows of the transition
matrix displayed in Table 1.
19
Note that matching the SSBS rms and the rms in my sample is not feasible.
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Previous studies such as Nickell et al. (2000) use ordered probit instead of multinomial
logit models to analyze Markov chains. Ordered probit models, however, imply that the
dierence between a transition from e.g. `no problem' to `medium problem' is qualitatively
the same as the transition from `medium problem' to `severe problem'.
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This does not,
however, appear to be very plausible. Moreover, using an ordered probit model to estimate
Markov chain models implies that dierentiated eects of particular variables on dierent
transitions cannot be captured. The dierences in the implications of the ordered probit and
the multinomial logit model are evident: ordered probit models are unable to discriminate
between the dierentiated eects of individual variables on dierent transitions.
In this paper, two variants of the multinomial logit model are estimated. The rst is the
traditional multinomial logit model as implemented in virtually any standard software pack-
age. The second variant is a multinomial logit model which takes into account unobserved
rm heterogeneity. Both models consider Markov chains of order 1 since Markov chains of
higher orders do not seem to be advisable here. Higher orders imply that the nancial state
in period t depends upon the state in some prior period t  s with s > 1.
The general model considered here is inspired by Gourieroux (1989), the extension with
unobserved rm heterogeneity borrows from Nguyen et al. (2000).
Model without heterogeneity
Let S
it
denote a variable that indicates the state in which rm i nds itself at time t. For
example, S
it
= j indicates that rm i is in state j at time t. The probability of transition
of rm i from state j at t  1 to state j
0
at t is given given by:
P
ijj
0
(t)  P (S
it
= j
0
jS
it 1
= j) =
exp(x
itj

jj
0
)
P
J
l=1
exp(x
itl

jl
)
; (1)
with i = 1; 2; :::; N; t = 0; 1; :::; T and j; j
0
= 1; 2; 3. The observed rm characteristics x
are assumed to inuence the probability of transition from state j to state j
0
in a way
that depends both on j and j
0
. For each transition, an individual parameter vector  is
estimated which linearly relates the vector of observed rm characteristics to the transition
probabilities.
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After imposing the identication restriction 
j2
=0, the following expressions are obtained:
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P
ij2
(t) =
1
1 +
P
J
l 6=2
exp(x
itl

jl
)
(2)
P
ijj
0
(t) =
exp(x
itj

jj
0
)
1 +
P
J
l 6=2
exp(x
itl

jl
)
; (3)
with j = 1; 2; 3, j
0
= 1; 3 now. Thus, multinomial logit models for each row of the transition
matrix are specied.
Let n
i;t 1;t
(jj
0
) denote indicator variables which are coded 1 if rm i has moved from state
20
The technical dierence between ordered probit and multinomial logit models is that the ordered probit
model is based on a single index, or a single latent variable, indepent of the number of categories, whereas
the multinomal logit model comes with as many indices as categories.
21
This is in contrast to the ordered probit model where only one, instead of three (or, after normalization,
two), parameter vectors are estimated for each row of the transition matrix.
22
If any vector q is added to the parameter vectors , the identical set of probabilities results since all
terms including q drop out. Therefore, one of the parameter vectors of each row of the transition matrix
needs to be normalized to zero in order to yield unique identication.
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j in t   1 to state j
0
at t and 0 otherwise. The log{likelihood function conditional on the
state occupied at t  1 then is:
ln L =
J
X
j=1
J
X
j
0
=1
ln L
jj
0
; with ln L
jj
0
=
N
X
i=1
T
X
t=1
n
i;t 1;t
(jj
0
) ln(P
ijj
0
(t)): (4)
Since the quantity
P
J
j
0
=1
ln L
jj
0
depends upon parameters only, the maximum likelihood
estimator can be obtained by separately maximizing the quantities
P
J
j
0
=1
ln L
jj
0
, i.e. by
separately maximizing the likelihood functions corresponding to each row of the transition
matrix.
Model with unobserved heterogeneity
In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity, a multinomial logit model with random
eects is also specied. These random eects correspond to each rm and each type of
transition. In this case, the transition probability is given by:
P
ijj
0
(t) =
exp(x
itj

jj
0
+ 
jj
0
u
ijj
0
)
P
J
i=1
exp(x
itl

jl
+ 
jl
u
ijl
)
; (5)
with i = 1; :::N , t = 1; :::T and j; j
0
= 1; 2; 3. The terms 
jj
0
u
ijj
0
are assumed to be mutually
independent and independent of x, with mean 0 and variance 
2
jj
0
. The random variable u
ijj
0
is assumed to be standard normally distributed. After imposing the identifying restriction
that 
j2
= 0, the following expressions are obtained:
P
ij2
(t) =
1
1 +
P
J
l 6=2
exp(x
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jl
+ 
jl
u
ijl
  
j2
u
ij2
)
(6)
P
ijj
0
(t) =
exp(x
itj

jj
0
)
1 +
P
J
l 6=2
exp(x
itl

jl
+ 
jl
u
ijl
  
j2
u
ij2
)
; (7)
where the parameters 
jl
have to be estimated. Since the transition probabilities depend
upon unoberserved variables, they have to be integrated out in order to compute the likeli-
hood function and to obtain:
E(P
ijj
0
) =
Z
+1
 1
Z
+1
 1
Z
+1
 1
P
ijj
0
(t)'(u
ij1
)'(u
ij2
)'(u
ij3
)du
ij1
du
ij2
du
ij3
; (8)
where '(:) denotes the density of the standard normal distribution. E(P
ijj
0
) can be approx-
imated using the following simulators:
^
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where the u
ijh
's are independent draws from the standard normal distribution.
The maximum likelihood estimator for the multinomial logit model with random eects is
obtained in the same way as the conventional estimator, i.e. as
ln L
jj
0
=
P
N
i=1
P
T
t=1
n
i;t;t 1
(jj
0
)ln(
^
EP
ijj
0
). Separate maximization is feasible in this case as
well.
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5 Estimation results
The empirical analysis begins by testing if signicant random eect are present. This can
easily be done by applying a Likelihood Ratio test for the unrestricted model with unob-
served heterogeneity against the restricted model without unobserved heterogeneity. The

2
test{statistic is 2.74 and hence insignicantly dierent from zero at the usual signicance
levels (p{value 0.9869). Therefore, the estimation results for the model with unobserved
heterogeneity are removed to Appendix C. Due to the insignicant dierences between the
two models, the interpretation of the estimation results focuses on the ndings of the model
without unobserved heterogeneity.
In order to ease the interpretation of the estimates, the tables displayed in the main body of
the paper do present marginal eects instead of coeÆcient vectors. Due to the normaliza-
tion, each coeÆcient has to be interpreted relative to the base category (`medium problem'
in this context). Marginal eects are the percentage changes in the transition from one
state to another due to a one unit change in one of the involved variables. For continuous
explanatory variables, the eect of a one unit change of the variable x
jk
on the transition
between states j and state j
0
is:
Æ
jj
0

@P
jj
0
@x
jk
= P
jj
0


jj
0
k
 
3
X
l 6=2
P
jl

: (11)
Hence, the eect of a change in the explanatory variable x
jk
depends on the expression in
brackets; the sign of the coeÆcient 
jj
0
k
does not determine the eect on the probability |
as opposed to binary choice and ordered choice models. The sign of 
jj
0
k
, however, indicates
the eect of variable x
k
on the corresponding choice relative to the base category `medium
problems'. Marginal eects are usually calculated at the means of the involved variables,
and I proceed the same way in this paper. The variance{covariance matrix for the marginal
eects is calculated using the `Delta{method' (e.g. Greene 1997, Sec. 6.7.5). The original
estimation results are displayed in Appendix D.
For the dummy variables, the percentage change associated with a switch from 0 to 1 instead
of the marginal eect as in equation (11) is calculated. Standard errors for the marginal
eects corresponding to the dummy variables are calculated using the `Delta'{method as
well.
The empirical analysis starts with the identication of the variables leading to transitions
from the `no problem' to one of the other three states, i.e. it is concerned with the rst row
of the transition matrix. Table 2 displays estimates of the marginal eects of the variables
motivated in Section 2 and for the transitions starting from `no problem'. Marginal eects
for the transitions starting from `medium problem' are shown in Table 3.
Firm age
The results for rm age are only partly consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 1.
For the transition from `no problem' to `medium problem', an inverse U{shaped and jointly
signicant eect is found. An inverse U{shaped and jointly signicant eect on the prob-
ability of moving into nancial distress | as predicted by Hypothesis 1 | is also found
for the transition from `medium problem' to `severe problem'. For both transitions, the
eect increases over the rm ages found in the sample. In contradiction to Hypothesis 1,
a U{shaped and jointly signicant eect of rm age is found for the transition from `no
problem' to `severe problem'; the minimum is reached at an age of 1.2 years.
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Table 2: Marginal eects (in percent) for transition from `no problem'
Transition from...
`no' to `no' `no' to `med.' `no' to `severe'
M. e. Std. err. M. e. Std. err. M. e. Std. err.
ln(age) -1.0330

0.3112 1.0787

0.2724 -0.0457 0.1664
ln(age)
2
-0.0213 0.1549 -0.1033 0.1318 0.1246

0.0839
ln(# of employees) -0.5338

0.3516 0.4326

0.2893 0.1013 0.2046
ln(# of employees)
2
0.0444 0.0882 0.0063 0.0718 -0.0507 0.0522
Limited liability -0.7246

0.1659 0.0145 0.1196 0.7101

0.1174
Corp. Shareholders 0.3055

0.2099 -0.2986

0.1779 -0.0069 0.1132
Multiple creditors 0.6104

0.2101 -0.4139

0.1784 -0.1965

0.1125
Diversication -0.2623

0.1555 -0.0084 0.1258 0.2706

0.0932
Sales index/100 0.0078

0.0030 -0.0028 0.0025 -0.0050

0.0017
Note: `M. e.' denotes marginal eects. The estimation included a total of 68,229 observa-
tion. See Appendix D for the coeÆcient estimates.
U{shaped eects of rm age on movements out of nancial distress as predicted by Hypoth-
esis 1 are not supported by the empirical results: rm age has a uniquely negative eect on
remaining in the `no problem' state. It does not have a signicant eect on the transition
from `medium problem' to `no problem' and has a U{shaped eect on the probability of
remaining in the `medium problem' state; the minimum is reached at an age of 5.2 years.
The very dierentiated eects of rm size on the various transition probabilities highlights
a major advantage of the multinomial logit model over the more restricted ordered probit
model as applied by Nickell et al. (2000): if an ordered probit model was used for estimating
the transition probabilities starting from `medium problem', e.g. uniquely negative (posi-
tive) eect would have been found for the probability of moving from `medium problem' to
`no problem' and for the probability of remaining in `medium problem' (on the probability
to switch from `medium problem' to `severe problem').
Earlier empirical studies which focus on the binary outcome rm exit/rm survival and
which do not consider more dierentiated types of rm performance, as my investigation
does, mostly support Hypothesis 1 and nd evidence for rst increasing and then decreasing
hazard rates of rm exit, as noted in the survey by Caves (1998, Section 2.3).
23
More recent
studies for Germany that come to the same conclusion include Harho et al. (1998) and
Prantl (2000).
These studies and some of my results contradict Agarwal and Gort's (1996) model of `orga-
nizational geriatics' which implies rst decreasing and then increasing hazard rates. They
regard the survival of rms as a trade{o between depreciation and obsolescence of their ini-
tial human and physical capital endowment and the benets of cumulative learning. Their
empirical analysis allows them to calculate `senility points', rm ages at which hazard rates
stop declining and turn up again.
Firm size
An inverse U{shaped eect of rm size on the probability of moving into nancial distress as
predicted by Hypothesis 2 is found for the transition from `no problem' to `severe problem'
23
One exception is the constantly increasing hazard rate of small Belgian rms found in Konings et al.
(1996).
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Table 3: Marginal eects for transition from `medium problem'
Transition from...
`med.' to `no' `med.' to `med.' `med.' to `severe'
M. e. Std. err. M. e. Std. err. M. e. Std. err.
ln(age) 0.9002 1.2104 -3.9325

1.8873 3.0323

1.5688
ln(age)
2
-0.6818 0.6338 1.1863 0.9565 -0.5045 0.7727
ln(# of employees) 4.5705

1.4445 -5.4563

2.1167 0.8858 1.7166
ln(# of employees)
2
-0.7939

0.3467 0.8688

0.5302 -0.0750 0.4359
Limited liability 1.7502

0.6366 -2.5974

0.9099 0.8472 0.7151
Corp. Shareholders 2.7083

1.3025 -3.1099

1.8498 0.4016 1.4338
Multiple creditors 2.4324

1.0645 0.2546 1.3701 -2.6870

0.9521
Diversication 0.2276 0.5900 -0.5089 0.9085 0.2813 0.7402
Sales index/100 -0.0125 0.0119 0.0525

0.0187 -0.0399

0.0155
Note: `M. e.' denotes marginal eects. The estimation included a total of 8,402 observa-
tion. See Appendix D for the coeÆcient estimates.
(the maximum is reached at a rm size of 2.7 employees) and from `medium problem' to
`severe problem' (where the maximum is not reached for the rm sizes found in the sample).
The latter eect, however, is not signicantly dierent from zero. A U{shaped eect of rm
size on movements out of nancial distress as predicted by Hypothesis 2 is not supported by
the estimation results: the impact of rm size on the transition from `medium problem' to
`no problem' is inverse U{shaped (with a maximum at 17.8 employees). The eect of rm
size on the transition from `no problem' to `medium problem' is uniquely positive. U{shaped
eects of rm size are present for the probability of remaining in the `no problem' state and
also for the probability of staying in the `medium problem' state.
Existing studies such as Harho et al. (1998) and Mata (1994) nd that rm size has a
negative impact on the probability to exit and hence contradict the prediction of Hypothesis
2. Empirical support for Hypothesis 2 is provided by Prantl (2000), who concludes that the
eect of rm size on hazard rates is inverse U{shaped for bankruptcy as a means of exit.
Limited liability
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, limited liability has a positive and signicant eect on the
transition from `no problem' to `severe problem': the probability that limited liability rms
move from `no problem' to `severe problem' is 0.7 percentage points larger than for rms
without limited liability. The eect on the probability of remaining in one of the start-
ing states is negatively aected. Somewhat surprisingly, the eect of limited liability on
the transition from `medium problem' to `no problem' is highly signicantly positive. This
implies that, given that a rm has encountered nancial pressure, the shareholders of the
limited liability rm have incentives to restructure rm debt.
The empirical results of this paper concerning the eect of limited liability on rm perfor-
mance are in broad accordance with earlier studies. In empirical studies using data sets very
comparable to the one used in this paper, Harho and Stahl (1995), Harho et al. (1998)
and Prantl (2000) nd negative eects of limited liability on rm survival and hence also
support Hypothesis 3.
Corporate shareholders
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The existence of corporate shareholders has a signicantly positive eect on the transition
from `medium problem' to `no problem' which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. Also in keep-
ing with Hypothesis 4, the impact of corporate shareholders is negative for the transition
from `no problem' to `medium problem'. A positive and weakly signicant eect is found
for the probability of remaining in the `no problem' state, a signicantly negative eect is
found for remaining in the `medium problem' state.
Empirical evidence on the eect of the existence of corporate shreholders on rm perfor-
mance is scarce. In an investigation of U.S. rms, Sharma (1998) nds that relatedness with
foreign parent rms has a negative eect on aquisitive rm exit supporting Hypothesis 4.
For Germany, Harho and Stahl (1995) do not nd signicant eects of corporate ownership
on rm exit.
Multiple credit relationships
The empirical results for the dummy variable for multiple credit relationships are perfectly
consistent with Hypothesis 5: rms with more than just one creditor are less likely of moving
into worse states while the opposite holds for rms with single creditors.
Comparable empirical results are presented by Harho and Korting (1998) who use German
survey data to show that nancially distressed rms tend to be involved in multiple lending
relationships while rms in a good nancial condition tend to rely on single borrowers.
Diversication
Diversication has signicant eects on the transitions starting from the `no problem' state.
It has a signicantly positive eect on the transition to the `severe problem' state and a
signicantly negative impact on the probability of remaining in the `no problem' category.
Hence, Hypothesis 6 is partially supported empirically.
Empirical evidence of the eect of diversication on nancial performance is scarce as well.
For a large sample of US rms, Berger and Ofek (1995) nd that diversication is at the
origin of the decline of the rm performance. It reduces rm protability and rm value.
Lang and Stulz (1994) show that diversication has had a negative eect on Tobin's q for
American rms during the 1980s and that the q of diversied rms is smaller than that of
the non{diversied rms. These results are consistent with the idea of Aw and Batra (1998)
who argue that rm diversication might be a manager's device to gain prestige. It fur-
ther enables managers to decrease the precision of information transmitted to shareholders.
Diversication also goes along with transaction costs. Studies for Germany, however, such
as that by Harho et al. (1998) and Prantl (2000), do not nd signicant eects of rm
diversication.
Macroeconomic eects
Improvements in the economic environment have the expected positive and signicant eect
on the transitions to states with improved nancial status as expected from Hypothesis 7.
The inverse eect is present for transitions to weaker nancial health statuses. Exceptions
are the transition from `no problem' to `medium problem' and from `medium problem' to
`no problem' where the eects are insignicant.
Now that the coeÆcients of the explanatory variables are estimated, it is easy to derive
individual rm{specic transition probabilities. If the transition probability of a rm has
to be calculated, the credit analyst simply has to plug in the characteristics of this rm into
expressions (2) and (3). For a 2 year old rms with 10 employees, limited liability, corpo-
rate shareholders, more than one creditor, which is diversied and for a sales index of 20
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percent for the rm's sector, the probabilities of moving from `medium problem' to `no prob-
lem'/`medium problem'/`severe problem' are: 18.4/74.2/7.3 percent respectively. To com-
pare, the transition probabilities for the same rm with unlimited liability are 14.3/78.8/6.9
percent respectively.
Table 4 displays the mean estimated transition probabilities and compares them with ac-
tual transition probabilities. The implied transition probabilities are estimated with high
precision; each of them is highly signicant from zero. Estimated and actual transition prob-
abilities compare very well, which indicates that the model suggested here is well suited for
practical purposes.
Table 4: Estimated and actual transition probabilities
Ending state
`no `medium `severe
Starting state problem' problem' problem'
'no problem' estimated 96.7 2.2 1.0
actual 96.6 2.4 1.1
'medium problem' estimated 6.4 84.1 9.5
actual 6.7 83.5 9.8
Diagnostics and goodness{of{t measures
The Multinomial Logit Model imposes the assumption of \Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives" (IIA) which states that the probability ratio of any two transition{probabilities
does not depend on the presence of other transition possibilities. If a subset of the choice set
truly is irrelevant, omitting it from the model does not change the parameter estimates sys-
tematically; if the subset is not irrelevant, the parameter estimates obtained when the choice
subset is omitted are inconsistent. The IIA assumtion can be tested using the Hausman
and McFadden (1984) test which is given by:
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The test statistic is 
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distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the rank of the matrix
V (
^
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u
) V (
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r
). Since this matrix has not always been positively semidenite, it is proceeded
along the lines of Small and Hsiao (1985). IIA cannot be rejected at the usual signicance
levels for any of the specications. Table 5 displays the test statistics and the associated
p{values.
A common property of any discrete choice model is that they always predict those states
best that are most densely populated. It is therefore rather surprising that 96.7 percent of
the actual outcomes for the transitions from the `no problem' state are correctly predicted.
For the transition from the `medium problem' state, the related gure is 84.1 percent. Mc-
Fadden's (1979) prediction success index for the transition from the `no problem' state is
0.03 and hence is quite modest, due to the dense population of the no{change state and
the narrow population of the other states. The prediction success index for the transitions
starting in the `medium problem' state is 0.12 percent and convenient for those kinds of
models.
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Table 5: Test of IIA (p{values in parentheses)
Departure state Left{out state
`no problem' `medium problem' `severe problem'
`no problem' | 9.3214 5.7542
(0.5019) (0.8354)
`medium problem' 7.1467 | 11.1524
(0.7115) (0.3458)
6 Conclusions
The new Bank of International Settlements `Guidelines on Capital Adequacy for Bank Credit
Assets' have put severe reform pressure on private bank's corporate lending. One of the most
important novelties associated with the New Basel Capital Approach is that banks will be
allowed to used internal credit ratings in order to determine the risk weights associated with
a particular credit. Such an internal rating system appears to be diÆcult to implement for
many private banks for a very obvious reason: many private banks do not systematically
record their debtor's performance. In order to overcome this decit of data, it seems likely
that private banks will use data provided by credit rating agencies to obtain information on
individual debtors and to determine the riskiness of starting or pursuing a credit relation-
ship. In this paper, a simple method to estimate the credit risk of rms', as one particularly
important group of debtors, is suggested and implemented using data taken from Germany's
leading credit rating agency.
The paper begins by reviewing and integrating existing theoretical and empirical contribu-
tions to the credit risk and to the rm survival literature in order to condense variables
which help to explain rms' movements in and out of nancial distress. Seven variables are
identied this way: rm age, rm size, legal form, the existence of corporate shareholders,
the existence of multiple creditors, the degree of rm diversication and macroeconomic
eects.
Financial distress is dened by a rm's mode of credit repayment. If credits are repaid
within the agreed time limit, these rms are dened as being unaected by nancial dis-
tress. If they are unable to meet their obligations punctually, they are said to encounter
`medium nancial problems'. If court procedures are started, those rms are regarded as
having `severe' nancial distress.
In order to account for the history of rms' nancial status, Markov chain models are esti-
mated on a panel data set of newly founded eastern German rms from the business{related
services sector. The data set comprises 15,538 rms observed biennially from fall 1994 until
fall 1999 and amounts to a total of 90,302 observations. Multinomial logit models are used
to examine the driving forces behind movements in and out of nancial distress. Two vari-
ants of this model are estimated: the well known multinomial logit model and a multinomial
logit model that captures random eects.
The main results of the econometric analysis can be summarized as follows: both rm
age and rm size signicantly aect transition probabilities. The direction of this eect,
however, depends upon the starting state so that no general conclusions can be drawn on
this count. Financially non{distressed limited liability rms tend to switch to less desir-
able nancial states more often than unlimited liability entities. Interestingly, given that a
rm is already in `medium' distress, the probability of moving to the no{distress state is
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signicantly larger for limited liability than for unlimited liability rms. The existence of
corporate shareholders increases the probablity of transition to a more favorable nancial
status while just the reverse is true for relationships with multiple creditors. Firm diversi-
cation only has a signicant eect on transitions starting from the `no nancial distress'
state. The estimation results indicate that diversication increases the likelihood of move-
ments to worse nancial states. Finally, a positive macroeconomic development increases
the likelihood of transition to better nancial situations.
This paper of course is just the rst step in the development of an internal credit rating
system. The methodology and the data used here seem to be well suited to the analysis
of small and newly founded rms' credit risk. The construction of a complete credit rating
system is, however, beyond the scope of this paper and is left for further research.
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Appendix A: Data description
The data set used in this study was provided to the ZEW by Germany's largest credit
rating agency, Creditreform. Creditreform aims at collecting information on each and ev-
ery rm located in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The German data are collected
by 134 region{specic bureaus of Creditreform (`Vereine Creditreform') in a standardized
way (see Stahl 1991 for details). The individual branches of Creditreform are organized in
a franchising{system within the `Verband der Vereine Creditreform' (Creditreform associa-
tion). Creditreform's core business is to deliver information on the credit worthiness of rms
to Creditreform member rms. These information is requested in order to avoid starting a
business with an illiquid rm for example. Other branches of Creditreform's business are
the collection of bills and the provision of marketing information.
Firms typically enter the Creditreform database for two reasons: (i) Creditreform proactively
updates its database by using publicly available information such as the `Handelsregister'
(trade register to registration is compulsory for all incorporated rms), news and magazines
as well as company and balance{sheet reports and/or (ii) a customer or supplier requests
information on a prospective business partner. Information recorded in the initial data entry
include the ownership structure, the primary and secondary ve digit industry classication,
the legal form, the current number of employees, current sales, the rm foundation date and
the foundation date of predessor rms. This information is usually taken from interview
examinations by the Creditreform sta and/or from publicly available data resources and/or
(Stahl 1991). In order to be able to track rms, Creditreform attaches a rm identier to
each entity recorded in the database. This identier unfortunately is not always unique.
Multiple entries of single rms can occur if (i) a rm relocates geographically and hence
moves from one Creditreform bureau to another, (ii) a merger of rms via a rm foundation
takes places and (iii) an existing rm is split up via a rm foundation. In order to remove
multiple entries from the sample, I proceed along the lines of Almus et al. (2000, Section
3.2.2) who exclude multiple entries by using a search engine procedure based on written
text information corresponding to each rm recorded by Creditreform.
Creditreform started to transfer data referring to newly founded West German rms (often
referred to as the `ZEW Firm Foundation Panel West') in May 1990. Since September
1991, the ZEW has also received the entire database related to East Germany (called the
`ZEW Firm Foundation Panel East', although this database also includes incumbent rms).
Both data sets are regularly updated twice a year. The ZEW then receives the information
corresponding to each rm for which information had been delivered in the past plus the
information on rms which have recently entered the Creditreform database.
Creditreform is unable to instantaneously record each and every newly founded rm. This
is not surprising since the number of rm foundations is large: according to the Federal Sta-
tistical OÆce (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000), a total of 174,018 rms were newly founded
in Germany in 1998. Consequently, Creditreform did not transfer information on these
newly founded but not yet recorded rms to the ZEW. Hence, the older waves of the ZEW
rm foundation panel West missed a considerable number of observations. This problem
has recently been overcome since Creditreform changed its data format and now delivers
information on rms founded and recorded between two successive data deliveries as well as
on rms which were recorded after the respective last data delivery. Such a problem is not
present in the East German Firm Foundation Panel since the ZEW receives information on
all of the East German rms recorded by Creditreform.
As Harho et al. (1996 and, in less detail, 1998) have pointed out, the data collection habits
of Creditreform dier from academic standards. A rst dierence is that Creditreform acts
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in a demand{driven manner. This implies that rms tend to enter the database and/or
are updated if there is demand for information on the respective type of rms. Hence, two
sources of sampling (not necessarily selection) bias are likely to be present in the Creditre-
form data. The rst refers to rms size. Information on large rms is likely to be requested
more than information on small rms since large rms are more engaged in relationships to
multiple suppliers and customers in general than small rms. In a comparison of Creditre-
form data with data taken from oÆcial sources, Licht and Stahl (1994) demonstrate that
the Creditreform data cover virtually all rms with more than ve employees. The data
coverage of Creditreform has, however, markedly improved since 1994 as Almus et al. (2000)
note.
In order to check whether there is an oversampling of large rms and an undersampling
of small rms, I compare the share of rms in eleven sales size classes (in million Ger-
man Marks) listed below with the Sales Tax Statistic compiled by the oÆcial statistics. The
oÆcial source of information on tax consultancy, architecture and engineering is Federal Sta-
tistical OÆce (Statistisches Bundesamt 1998a), for transport it is Statistisches Bundesamt
(1998b), for management consultancy and software it is Statistisches Bundesamt (1997).
The data refer to 1995, 1995, and 1994, respectively and also correspond to East Germany.
The rm shares as displayed in the table below refer to these years accordingly.
It is important to note that the oÆcial statistic and the Firm Foundation Panel East data
cannot be readily compared since they correspond to all ms in the business{related service
sector instead of to newly founded rms only. The lack of data provision on newly founded
rms, however, hampers any direct comparison so that the gures displayed and compared
in the table below give at least some guidance on whether or not there is a rm size bias in
the Firm Foundation Panel East.
Tax cons. Arc. & eng. Transport
OÆcial Sample OÆcial Sample OÆcial Sample
25,000-50,000 2.0 0.4 3.9 0.2
50,000-250,000 29.5 30.5 58.6 14.2 17.6 18.2
250,000-500,000 28.1 25.3 17.9 18.4 14.7 15.5
500,000-1 Mio. 27.2 26.5 11.3 29.1 26.5 24.3
1 Mio.-2 Mio. 9.1 9.8 5.8 22.4 21.1 19.9
> 2 Mio. 4.1 7.5 2.5 15.8 20.9 22.1
Man. Cons. Software
OÆcial Sample OÆcial Sample
25,000-50,000 0.1 0.2
50,000-250,000 35.4 20.1 20.6
250,000-500,000 25.0 16.2 28.1 26.7
500,000-1 Mio. 18.8 26.5 32.4 24.9
1 Mio.-2 Mio. 14.6 24.4 27.0 18.1
> 2 Mio. 6.3 12.6 12.5 9.5
The table indicates minor deviations for tax consultancy and transport. Medium deviations
are present for management consultancy and software while there are some sharp dierences
for architecture and engineering, where a large number of free{lancers is present.
The second potential sampling bias refers to rms' legal forms since, as Licht and Stahl
(1994) have demonstrated, the Creditreform database includes information on almost all
rms led in the trade register. It is therefore to be expected that limited liability rms
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should be overrepresented in the Creditreform data while the reverse is true for small sole
proprietorship rms. A comparison of the data used in this paper with the Sales Tax Statis-
tic (Statistisches Bundesamt 1998c) only partially supports this initial guess: while the legal
forms general commercial partnership (`Oene Handelsgesellschaft | OHG'), Limited com-
mercial partnership ('Kommanditgesellschaft | KG'), stock corporation and `other' appear
to be correctly represented, an overcoverage of limited liability rms and an undercoverage
of sole proprietorship rms is found:
Legal form OÆcial Sample di.
Sole proprietorship 73.5 42.5 31.0
(`Einzelunternehmen')
General commercial partnership 7.8 11.2 -3.4
(`Oene Handelsgesellschaft - OHG')
Limited commercial partnership 1.3 1.3 0.0
('Kommanditgesellschaft - KG')
Stock corporation 0.0 0.0 0.0
Limited Liability corporation 16.9 44.6 -27.8
Other legal forms 0.2 0.4 -0.1
It has to, however, be kept in mind that the gures taken from the oÆcial statistics refer
to all of Germany and not only to East Germany. Moreover, the gures are related to all
rms in Germany and not only to newly founded rms.
Is the oversampling of large rms and of rms with limited liability likely to lead to a se-
lection bias in the present context? Selection bias arises whenever the probability of the
inclusion of a particular observation in the sample depends upon the phenomenon to be
analyzed. In the present context, the question to be answered is whether the probability of
Creditreform recording a rm depends upon the rm's nancial distress situation. This in
turn would only be the case if rms requesting information knew in advance that the rm it
wishes to do business with is in nancial distress. But if this is true, why should the Credit-
reform customer submit a costly request to the credit agency? This view is supported by
the Firm Foundation Panel data: 89 percent | and hence ten percentage points more than
in the overall sample | are not nancially distressed when they enter the database. Nine
percent have intermediate problems and three percent have to cope with severe problems.
In conclusion, rm size and legal status do not appear to lead to a selection bias in the
estimates.
Another source, and at least potentially a more severe source, of selection bias is the ir-
regular updating of rm information. As a prot{maximizing rm, Creditreform tends to
proactively update information on rms for which it expects customer requests in the near
future i.e. without the current presence of customer requests. This source of selection bias
has been thoroughly discussed by Harho et al. (1996, 1998). Harho et al. were able
to control for potential selection bias in their rm growth and survival estimates by con-
ducting telephone interviews with those rms that have not been updated regularly. With
regard to the sample size present here, such a procedure is rendered impossible. However,
with respect to the subject of analysis, the situation is markedly dierent compared to the
study by Harho et al. To see that, recall that Creditreform's main business is to provide
its customers with information on the nancial status of a prospective business partner
and also acts as a debt collecting agency. Therefore, Creditreform is eager to proactively
become aware of changes in rms' nancial statuses so that it seems likely that a selec-
tion bias as described by Harho et al. (1996, 1998) is not present here. If this view is
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correct, then the population of the three `no{change' categories (rms remain in the `no
problem'/`intermediate problem'/`severe problem' category) should remain the same inde-
pendent of the number of updates having occured over time. A comparison of the transition
matrices corresponding to (i) all rms in the sample and (ii) to rms that have been up-
dated at least ve times conrms the initial guess: the population of the `no{change'{states
remains remarkably stable regardless of the number of updates (also compare Table 1 in the
text):
1 up{ more than
date only 5 updates di.
remaining in `no problem' 95.6 94.7 0.9
remaining in `mid problem' 79.0 79.5 -0.5
remaining in `severe problem' 96.3 94.1 2.3
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics
# of obs. Mean/share Std. dev. Median
Starting state: `no problem'
ln(age) 68,229 0.9067 0.6789 1.0986
ln(age)
2
68,229 1.2830 1.2855 1.2069
ln(# of employees) 68,229 1.6097 0.7737 1.3863
ln(# of employees)
2
68,229 3.1898 3.0017 1.9218
Limited liability 68,229 0.4981
Corp. Shareholders 68,229 0.0864
Multiple creditors 68,229 0.0780
Diversication 68,229 0.2484
Sales index/100 68,229 -1.6477 20.8330 -6.2500
Starting state: `medium problem'
ln(age) 8,402 0.9721 0.6787 1.0986
ln(age)
2
8,402 1.4054 1.3213 1.2069
ln(# of employees) 8,402 1.5771 0.7970 1.3863
ln(# of employees)
2
8,402 3.1225 3.1131 1.9218
Limited liability 8,402 0.4843
Corp. Shareholders 8,402 0.0536
Multiple creditors 8,402 0.0884
Diversication 8,402 0.2588
Sales index/100 8,402 -0.9969 20.7184 -6.2500
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Appendix C: Parameter estimation results: models w/ heterogene-
ity
Transition from...
`no' to `no' `no' to `severe'
base category: `no' to `medium'
Coe. Std. err. Coe. Std. err.
ln(# of employees) -0.2082

0.1376 -0.0932 0.2632
ln(# of employees)
2
-0.0022 0.0342 -0.0579 0.0666
ln(age) -0.5140

0.1274 -0.5554

0.2233
ln(age)
2
0.0481 0.0628 0.1861

0.1111
Sales index/100 0.1405 0.1204 -0.4185

0.2177
Limited liability -0.0143 0.0568 0.7532

0.1050
Diversication 0.0010 0.0601 0.2798

0.1026
Multiple creditors 0.2171

0.1028 -0.0279 0.1854
Corp. Shareholders 0.1514

0.0968 0.1412 0.1579
Constant 4.5387

0.1353 -0.7256

0.2477

21
0.0086 0.0978

22
0.0667 0.1141

23
0.1413 0.1713
# of obs. and log{likelihood value
# of obs. 66,011 686
Total # of obs. 68,229
Loglik. Value -11,009.50
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Transition from...
`medium' to `no' `medium' to `severe'
base category: `no' to `medium'
Coe. Std. err. Coe. Std. err.
ln(# of employees) 0.8241

0.2472 0.1596 0.2033
ln(# of employees)
2
-0.1424

0.0603 -0.0184 0.0516
ln(age) 0.1938 0.2134 0.3694

0.1845
ln(age)
2
-0.1251 0.1115 -0.0670 0.0915
Sales index/100 -0.2703

0.2096 -0.4869

0.1822
Limited liability 0.3185

0.0982 0.1222

0.0814
Diversication 0.0438 0.1017 0.0366 0.0860
Multiple creditors 0.3437

0.1406 -0.3285

0.1484
Corp. Shareholders 0.4115

0.1666 0.0797 0.1647
Constant -3.7419

0.2470 -2.7134

0.1932

21
0.1971 0.1947

22
0.1121 0.1311

23
0.0034 0.1721
# of obs. and log{likelihood value
# of obs. 541 798
Total # of obs. 8,402
Loglik. Value -4,529.61
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Appendix D: Parameter estimation results: models w/o hetero-
geneity
Transition from...
`no' to `no' `no' to `severe'
base category: `no' to `medium'
Coe. Std. err. Coe. Std. err.
ln(# of employees) -0.2071

0.1375 -0.0905 0.2631
ln(# of employees)
2
-0.0025 0.0342 -0.06 0.0666
ln(age) -0.5135

0.1273 -0.55

0.2224
ln(age)
2
0.0479 0.0627 0.18

0.1108
Sales index/100 0.0014 0.0012 -0.0042

0.0022
Limited liability -0.0142 0.0568 0.7533

0.105
Diversication 0.0012 0.0601 0.28

0.1024
Multiple creditors 0.2168

0.1028 -0.0273 0.1845
Corp. Shareholders 0.1510

0.0967 0.1403 0.1577
Constant 4.5353

0.1352 -0.721

0.2459
Firm size 39.58

25.86

Firm age 110.74

11.14

CoeÆcient vector 148.20

89.97

Entire coe. vector 284.04

# of obs. and log{likelihood value
# of obs. 66,011 686
Total # of obs. 68,229
Loglik. Value -11,009.98
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Transition from...
`medium' to `no' `medium' to `severe'
base category: `no' to `medium'
Coe. Std. err. Coe. Std. err.
ln(age) 0.1947 0.2124 0.3707

0.1842
ln(age)
2
-0.1263 0.1110 -0.0680 0.0914
ln(# of employees) 0.8170

0.2461 0.1592 0.2031
ln(# of employees)
2
-0.1410

0.0600 -0.0183 0.0516
Limited liability 0.3169

0.0977 0.1213

0.0813
Corp. Shareholders 0.4124

0.1657 0.0795 0.1643
Multiple creditors 0.3428

0.1401 -0.3306

0.1481
Diversication 0.0432 0.1012 0.0359 0.0859
Sales index/100 -0.0027

0.0021 -0.0049

0.0018
Constant -3.7134

0.2419 -2.7089

0.1926
LR tests of joint signicance (
2
{values)
Firm size 24.36

3.48
Firm age 1.52 18.12

CoeÆcient vector 76.61

44.23

Entire coe. vector 118.09

# of obs. and log{likelihood value
# of obs. 541 798
Total # of obs. 8,402
Loglik. Value -4,530.50
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